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The nature of the microeconomic frictions that 
transform sudden stops in output collapses is not only 
of academic interest, but also crucial for the correct 
design of policy responses to prevent and address these 
episodes and the lack of evidence on this regard is an 
important shortcoming. This paper uses industry-
level data in a sample of 45 developed and emerging 
countries and a differences-in-differences methodology 
to provide evidence of the role of financial frictions for 
the consequences of sudden stops. The results show that, 
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consistently with financial frictions being important, 
industries that are more dependent on external finance 
decline significantly more during a sudden stop, 
especially in less financially developed countries. The 
results are robust to controlling for other possible 
mechanisms, including labor market frictions. The paper 
also provides results on the role of comparative advantage 
during sudden stops and on the usefulness of various 
policy responses to attenuate the consequences of these 
shocks.Sudden Stops and Financial Frictions: Evidence from 
Industry Level Data 
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In the last three decades, episodes of sharp contractions in international capital flows to 
emerging  markets,  known  as  sudden  stops,  have  become  a  common  phenomenon. 
According to Edwards (2007), and Rothenberg and Warnock (2006), a typical emerging 
market  country  is  affected  by  one  of  these  episodes  roughly  once  every  decade.  The 
increase in capital flows to “frontier” markets during the last decade and the revived 
interest  in  emerging  markets  following  the  recent  global  financial  crisis  suggest  that 
sudden stops may now likely to affect a broader set of countries and may do it in a 
deeper manner. 
In addition to their prevalence, the academic and policy interest in these episodes arises 
from the fact that they are typically associated with collapses in real activity. Edwards 
(2007) finds that the current account reversals associated with sudden stops lead to an 
average drop in GDP growth of about four percent, and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi  
(2006) document a collapse in GDP associated with systemic sudden stops of about 10 
percent.  These  collapses  in  real  activity  are  also  typically  accompanied  by  large 
depreciations and unemployment.  
The simultaneous occurrence of sudden stops and output contractions is a stylized fact, 
but from a theoretical point of view, a sudden lack of access to international capital 
markets does not necessarily have to lead to a decline in GDP, as noticed by Chari, 
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005). They study a simple model of a small open economy that 
suffers a sudden tightening in its international collateral constraint, and show that, in 




1 The intuition is straightforward: a (borrowing) economy that loses access 
to international capital markets needs to export goods to repay its initial debt .  To 
reduce the negative impact of this shift on consumption, the representative consumer 
will work more a nd increase production.  Therefore, this simple model shows that the 
correlation between sudden stops and output collapses results from other frictions that 
interact with the lack of access to international capital markets and counterweight the 
forces leading to an increase in output.
2  
Since  additional  frictions  are  required  for  sudden  stops  having  negative  real 
consequences, the immediate question is what those frictions are. Most theoretical papers 
emphasize financial frictions at the firm level in the fo rm of working capital financing 
constraints. For instance, in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Mendoza (2008) and Christiano 
et al. (2004), firms must borrow to pay in advance a fraction of the wage bill or 
intermediate inputs facing some form of financial const raint that induces a wedge 
between the external and internal cost of funds and distort some of the investment 
                                                            
1 Chari, Kehoe, and MacGrattan (2005) show that the impact of a sudden stop is equivalent to 
the  impact  of  an  increase  in  government  consumption  in  a  prototype  closed  economy,  which 
absent  other  frictions  leads  to  an  increase  in  output  (Aiyagari,  Christiano,  and  Eichenbaum, 
1992). 
2 A slightly different view of sudden stops do not take the reversals as an external shock, but tries 
to derive them endogenously from the interaction of standard productivity or demand shocks and 
a series of market imperfections. Most of this literature focuses on financial market imperfections 
(Calvo,  1998;  Mendoza,  2002;  2008;  Mendoza  and  Smith,  2002;  2006).  In  this  literature,  the 
sudden tightening of the international borrowing constraint does not trigger a recession, but is the 
recession (negative productivity shock) that triggers the tightening of the constraint and enhances 
the initial effect of the shock under appropriate conditions. According to this view, a recession 
would be more likely to result in a sudden stop in less financially developed countries, but it 
would still be the case that industries subject to stronger financial frictions and with smaller 
incentives to export would be the most affected.     
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margins. Other types of financial constraints are also present in the models of Calvo 
(1998), Mendoza (2002, 2008), Mendoza and Smith (2002 and 2004), among others. In 
most of this literature, the sudden tightening of the international borrowing constraint 
does not trigger a recession, but is the recession (e.g. negative productivity shock) that 
triggers the tightening of the constraint and enhances the initial effect of the shock under 
appropriate conditions. According to this view, a sudden stop, understood as a reversal 
in  capital  flows,  is  more  likely  to  result  in  a  recession  in  countries  where  financial 
frictions are more prevalent, and in a larger output decline in industries that are both 
more sensitive to financial frictions and less benefited by relative price changes favoring 
tradable sectors.  
In parallel to the literature focusing on financial frictions, a smaller literature considers 
the role of labor market frictions that preclude the prompt reallocation of labor between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors required by the sudden stop of capital flows (Kehoe 
and Ruhl, 2007). This type of mechanism would result in a relation between the degree 
of financial frictions in a country and its response to a sudden-stop. In addition, Martin 
and Rey (2006) consider the role of international segmentation of financial and good 
markets, incomplete asset markets, and expectation shocks to produce capital flights and 
output  collapses  in  developing  countries.  This  model  would  suggest  some  relation 
between the segmentation of goods markets and the impact of the expectations shock, 
which may translate in less tradable sectors being relatively more affected. 
Despite the crucial role that micro-level frictions play in the determination of the real 
consequences  of  sudden  stops  from  a  theoretical  perspective,  there  is  little  empirical 
evidence  on  their  qualitative  and  quantitative  importance.  Most  of  the  empirical 
literature  on  sudden  stops  has  worked  at  the  country  level  of  aggregation,  and  has 
focused on quantifying the consequences of sudden stops on macro aggregates (Calvo,  
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Izquierdo, and Mejia, 2008; Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2006; Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-
Kung, 2006; Guidotti et al., 2004; Ortiz et al., 2007). This literature studies the role of 
various types of macroeconomic imbalances in the incidence of sudden stops, and focuses 
on  determining  the  role  of  ex-ante  and  ex-post  policies  in  dampening  their  real 
consequences. The nature of the microeconomic frictions that transform sudden stops in 
output collapses is not only of academic interest, but also crucial for the correct design of 
policy responses to prevent and address these episodes and the lack of evidence on this 
regard is an important shortcoming. In reaction to this situation, Chari et al. (2005) 
conclude:  “The  key  frictions  that  generate  output  drops  in  the  existing  literature  on 
sudden  stops  are  subtle  ones  for  which  so  far  there  is  little  evidence.  Finding  that 
evidence is a challenge for future research.”  
This paper provides evidence of the importance of financial frictions for the propagation 
of sudden stops to the real economy using detailed industry level data for a large set of 
developed  and  emerging  countries.  The  paper  exploits  the  heterogeneous  response  of 
different industries to  the occurrence of a sudden stop, and the relationship between 
these responses and industry characteristics to identify the mechanisms at work in the 
propagation  of  the  sudden  stops  to  the  real  economy.  This  approach  has  several 
advantages  over  existing  studies  based  on  aggregate  (country-level)  behavior.  Most 
importantly,  the  reverse  causality  between  macroeconomic  performance  and  the 
occurrence of sudden stop is much less of a concern when looking at the relation between 
detailed industry-level activity and aggregate shocks, such as sudden stops. Furthermore, 
the heterogeneous responses of industries to sudden stops allow us to use a difference-in-
difference approach to identify the empirical importance of various possible mechanisms 
of  transmission  of  sudden  stops  to  the  real  economy.  In  particular,  the  paper  tests 
whether,  according  to  most  existing  theories,  sudden  stops  result  in  a  larger  output 
decline  in  industries  that  are  more  sensitive  to  financial  frictions  and  less  likely  to  
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expand  exports,  and  whether  this  is  especially  true  in  less  financially  developed 
countries.  These  hypotheses  are  tested  using  detailed  output  data  for  28  industries 
comprising the complete manufacturing sector in a sample of 45 emerging and developed 
countries that experienced sudden-stops in the last 30 years.  
The results show that, indeed, output in sectors with higher external financing needs 
contract relatively  more during sudden-stops  episodes.  The  average  decline in  output 
growth among manufacturing industries is about 5 percent, but an industry with high 
external  dependence  (one  standard  deviation  above  the  average)  contracts  3  percent 
more than an industry with low external dependence (one standard deviation below the 
average).  This  larger  decline  among  industries  with  high  external  dependence  is 
significantly  more  pronounced  among  countries  where  firms  are  likely  to  experience 
higher  financial  frictions,  such  as  emerging  markets  or  countries  with  less  developed 
financial markets, and among industries with little comparative advantages that are less 
likely to experience pressure to expand production. 
Both  the  average  and  differential  effect  of  sudden  stops  are  much  larger  when 
considering  only  the  episodes  that  coincide  with  an  aggregate  output  contraction 
(recession), especially among financially underdeveloped countries. This shows that the 
simultaneous occurrence of a sudden stop and recessions are episodes when financing 
constraints  are  particularly  tight.  This  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  the 
interaction of sudden stops and financing constraints at the micro level is behind the 
correlation between sudden stops and aggregate output declines.  
The  different  effect  of  sudden  stops  across  countries  with  low  and  high  financial 
development is not purely due to differences in the size of the aggregate contractions 
associated with the sudden stop. Controlling for this size, all industries, and especially 
those with high external dependence experience a larger output contraction among less  
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financially developed countries. However, when looking only at sudden stop recessions 
the average manufacturing growth decline among manufacturing industries is similar in 
financially developed and underdeveloped countries, and the larger differential effect on 
externally  dependent  industries  operating  in  less  financially  developed  countries 
previously documented becomes smaller statistically insignificant. This tells us that the 
interaction between sudden stops and financing constraints results in larger aggregate 
contractions among less financially  developed  countries than in more developed  ones.  
These results are robust to a battery of tests and do not crucially depend on the specific 
measure of sudden stops used or other details of the specification. 
Looking at the differential impact of sudden stops on industries across other dimensions 
shows  that  durable  industries  also  contract  significantly  more  during  these  episodes, 
especially so in less financially developed countries. This is a very robust pattern of the 
data, and suggests that at least part of the cyclical behavior previously documented for 
durable industries come from financial frictions affecting the supply or demand for these 
goods. The results also show that industries with smaller comparative advantages decline 
relatively more during a sudden stop across all groups of countries. 
We show that some policy actions may help reducing the impact of sudden stops on 
aggregate fluctuations. For instance, we show that a high level of international reserves 
reduces  the  average  manufacturing  output  decline  during  a  sudden  stop,  mainly  by 
reducing  the  correlation  between  sudden  stops  and  aggregate  output  contractions.  In 
other words, in countries with high levels of reserves, a sudden stop is less likely to result 
in  a  recession,  so  the  average  and  differential  declines  in  manufacturing  activity  are 
smaller. Among sudden stops that are associated with recessions, a high level of initial 
reserves  has  no  smoothing  role.  Nonetheless,  we  also  show  that  following  a  loose 
monetary policy may also help dampening the impact of sudden stops both by reducing  
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their correlation with recessions, but also by dampening their impact after a recession 
has  started.  These  effects  are  more  pronounced  among  emerging  and  less  financially 
developed  markets,  showing  that  they  do  not  come  only  from  the  comparison  of 
industrial countries that can follow countercyclical policies and the rest.  
This paper contributes to the vast literature on the propagation and nature of sudden 
stops.  As  discussed  above,  the  theoretical  literature  has  shown  that  a  capital  flow 
reversal does not necessarily lead to output contraction, and that the propagation to the 
real side may require of additional frictions in financial or labor markets.
3 Nonetheless, 
there is little direct empirical evidence testing this conjecture. The evidence presented in 
this paper helps partially fill this gap. Some recent papers have also tried to understand 
the nature of these frictions. The closest to our paper is Gallego and Tessada (2009) who 
show that sudden stops  have a larger impact on job flows on industries experiencing 
stronger financial constraints in a sample of 2 -digit manufacturing industries in 4 Latin 
American countries. The results of this paper complement those of Gallego and Tessada 
(2009) in several dimensions. First, it shows that, in addition to job flows, production of 
financially dependent industries contracts relatively more during a sudden stop. Second, 
it uses  a larger sample of 47 countries worldwide   and  a granular set of 28 3 -digit 
industries. Third, it controls for several industry characteristics that relate to the 
heterogeneous response of industries to sudden stops, such as the durability of the goods 
it produces, and its degree of comparative advantages.  Finally, this paper also studies 
the role of standard policy responses such as reserve accumulation and countercyclical 
monetary policy in taming the real consequences of sudden stops. 
                                                            
3 Calvo (1998),  Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Mendoza (2008), Christiano et al. (2004), Mendoza 
(2002, 2008), Mendoza and Smith (2002 and 2006), among others.  
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The paper also contributes to the recent literature on sudden stop recoveries. There has 
recently been an interest in the quick recoveries experienced by many emerging markets 
suffering from systemic banking and currency crises. This phenomenon has already been 
labeled  as  “V-shaped  recoveries”  and  “Phoenix-miracles”  by  different  authors 
(Eichengreen and Rose, 2003; Calvo et al., 2006). The underlying observation being that 
in many countries output recovers surprisingly quickly after collapses of the exchange 
rate  regime,  banking  sector,  and  massive  capital  flows  reversals.  Moreover,  in  many 
cases, this recovery seems to be “creditless” (Calvo et al., 2006), that is, output (and to 
a lesser extent investment) expands without a commensurate expansion of credit. This 
evidence seems in contradiction with the liquidity crunch view of sudden stops, but could 
be explained by compositional changes in the structure of recovery. Industries that need 
relatively little outside liquidity to  operate  could benefit from  the resources freed  by 
liquidity squeezed sectors and lead the recovery. We show that industries with little need 
of  external  financing  are  indeed  relatively  benefited  during  these  episodes,  especially 
those that have revealed comparative advantages, indicating that these industries may 
be behind the speedy recovery observed after sudden stops.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodological 
approach  used  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  sudden  stops  affect  relatively  more  those 
industries that are more dependent in external finance, and especially so in countries 
with low financial development. Section 3 describes the data sources. Section 4 presents 
the main results of the paper. Section 5 conducts a series of robustness tests on the main 
results. Section 6 studies the role of policy responses. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
If financial frictions are behind the negative impact of sudden stops on the real economy, 
industries that require larger amounts of external financing, that is those with higher  
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external dependence, should be relatively more affected by these episodes, especially so in 
financially  underdeveloped  countries.
4  As noticed by Chari, Kehoe, and MacGrattan 
(2005), a sudden stop also puts pressure to expand production through a simple wealth 
effect. For the sudden stop to result in a decline in output, it is necessary that financial 
frictions be strong enough to overcome these incentives to expand output to ship abroad. 
This is most likely to occur in sectors that require more external financing, especially in 
countries where this financing may be scarce.  
This contraction is also more likely to occur for goods  that are less tradable. In fact, 
there is widespread evidence that sudden stops result in a relative expansion of tradable 
sectors (Tornell and Martinez, 2003; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2009; among others). Thus, one 
would also expect that the industries that should decline the most during a sudden stop 
are those that are relatively less tradable and more   exposed to financial frictions, 
regardless of whether it is sudden stops interacting with financial frictions that cause 
recessions or vice-versa.  
To  test  th ese  hypotheses,  we  estimate  the  parameters  of  the  following  empirical 
specification:  
 
where  ,, i c t g  is the growth rate of sector i  in country c at time t , and  , , 1 i c t Share   is the 
lagged share of total manufacturing value added of the same industry. The variable  , ct SS  
indicates  whether  country  c is  experiencing  a  sudden  stop  at  time t  (to  be  defined 
below), and  i EXFD  is  a  measure  of  an  industry's  external  financial  dependence.  The 
                                                            
4  See Braun and Larraín (2006) and Raddatz (2006) for the relation between industry volatility 
and response to shocks and external and working capital needs.  
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vector of controls ,, i c t X  includes, among other things, the interaction of the sudden stop 
indicator with measures of other dimensions of heterogeneity across industries, such as 
an indicator of whether they produce durable goods, their degree of capital intensity, etc.  
The parameters  , ic   and  t   are country-industry and time fixed effects that control non-
parametrically  for  all  sources  of  variation  across  these  dimensions. In  alternative 
specifications, we  also  allow the time  fixed  effect  to  vary  across  industries  (capturing 
global  industrial  cycles).  The  main  parameter  of  interest  is     that  measures  the 
differential  impact  of  sudden  stops  on  industries  with  different  levels  of   external 
dependence.  If  sudden  stops  produce  a  relatively  larger  decline  in  output  in  sectors 
subject  to  stronger  financial  frictions,  this  parameter  should  be  significantly  negative. 
The parameter   that captures the average growth of manufacturing output during a 
sudden  stop  is  also  of  interest,  and  its  comparison  across  groups  of  countries  and 
industries  can  shed  some  light  on  the  mechanisms  of  propagation  of   sudden  stops. 
Nonetheless, in some of the robustness tests we will include country-year fixed effects to 
capture non-parametrically this source of variation.  
Beyond the average effect of sudden stops across countries, if financial frictions are really 
at the core of the propagation mechanism, the   coefficient should be larger in absolute 
value  among  financially  underdeveloped  countries,  where  financial  frictions  are  more 
likely to bind. We test this hypothesis by separately estimating the model in equation 
(1) among countries with relatively high and low levels of financial development (defined 
below) and  financial  market  access.  Furthermore,  as  explained  above,  the  mechanism 
should be weaker in industries with stronger incentives to expand production to increase 
net exports. Thus, we also separately estimate the model using data from industries that 
are relatively more (less) competitive within a country, as captured by their revealed 
comparative  advantages,  and  test  whether  the difference  in    between  financially 
developed and underdeveloped countries is larger for industries with weaker comparative  
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advantages.  Finally,  we  also  want  to  test  whether  certain  policies,  such  as  the 
accumulation of international reserves, help reduce the negative consequences of sudden 
stops. To this end we will add the interaction of the different variables in equation (1) 
with measures of policy responses and test whether indeed these interactions help explain 
differences in the average impact of sudden stops or differences in their impact across 
industries.  
3. Data 
For our main indicator of sudden stops, we follow Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar 
(2004) in defining a sudden stop  , ct SS  as  a year in which the annual change in  the 
capital account (scaled by GDP) is one standard deviation below the average and also 
below  5  percent  of  GDP.  Both  the  standard  deviation  and  the  average  are  country 
specific and computed using all available data during 1975-2005 from the International 
Monetary Fund (2008), International Financial Statistics (henceforth IFS).
5 In addition 
to this baseline definition, we also consider three alternatives ways of identifying sudden 
stops that have been previously used in the literature. First, we follow Rothemberg and 
Warnock (2006) and  Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2008)  and define a sudden stop 
considering annual changes in the capital account  at least one standard deviation below 
average that eventually reaches two standard deviations below average (regardless of the 
size of the decline as a share of GDP).  Second, we  further  follow  Rothemberg and 
Warnock (2006), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2008), and Gallego and Tessada (2009) 
and construct rolling standard deviations to define time  varying thresholds.  When 
following this procedure we use quarterly data from IFS to compute meaningful rolling 
                                                            
5 Changes in the capital account correspond to changes in financial flows as reported in series 
78BJ..DZF (Financial Account N.I.E.) from the IFS. GDP in US dollars also comes from the 
World Development Indicators.  
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standard deviations. Finally, we also use the systemic sudden stop indicators constructed 
by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004).  
Following  Calvo,  Izquierdo  and  Mejia  (2004)  we  also  show  results  restricting  our 
definition  of  sudden  stops  only  to  those  episodes  where  the  capital  account  reversal 
results in a recession, which we label as sudden stop recessions  , ct SSR . This indicator 
results from the interaction of the sudden stop indicator  , ct SS  with a recession indicator 
(defined below). In these cases, the sudden stop is associated with the whole recession 
episode. For instance, if a sudden stop occurs at any time during a 5-year recession or 
the year before a recession starts, we classify the whole 5 recession years as a sudden 
stop recession.  
To define a recession we follow Braun and Larrain (2006), and measure their occurrence 
using a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a country is in recession a given year 
and  zero  otherwise.  However,  our main  measure  of  recession  differs  from  Braun  and 
Larrain’s  (2006)  in  several  respects.  First,  while  Braun  and  Larrain  use  a  relative 
threshold to identify recessions as cases when the deviations of GDP from its HP filtered 
trend are larger than one standard deviations, we use an absolute threshold and identify 
a recession with an output contraction, much in the spirit of Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia 
(2004). Starting from this criterion, we roughly identify a cyclical peak as the year in 
which real output growth turns negative, and a trough as the year in which it turns 
positive.  All  years  between  the  peak  and  the  trough  are  considered  as  part  of  the 
recession  episode.  Of  course,  most  real-world  cases  do  not  fit  nicely  this  U-shaped 
pattern of recession and recoveries, so we also established criteria to deal with cases of 
“double-dipping”  and  short-lived  drops.  The  appendix  describes  the  details  of  the 
procedure. In addition to this baseline definition of a recession, we also considered the 
Braun and Larrain (2006) country-specific definition. We construct all these measures  
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using data on real local currency GDP from the World Bank (2007), World Development 
Indicators.  
Following Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung (2006) 
we keep in our sample only countries that are integrated to global financial markets 
(emerging  and  developed  economies)  since  the  literature  on  sudden  stops  focuses  on 
reversals in private capital flows that are likely different to the fluctuations in aid flows 
and remittances that constitute an important part of capital flows to poorer countries.  
The sample of 47 developed and developing countries considered in this study, and the 
detailed  list  of  episodes  of  capital  account  reversals,  recessions,  and  sudden-stops 
experienced by each of them are reported in Table 1 and summarized in Figure 1. Most 
of the countries in the sample have experienced a recession during 1975-2003, and almost 
all emerging economies considered have experienced a capital account reversal. Only two 
developed countries that have experienced no recession during these 28 years (Austria 
and Norway). Two emerging economies have experienced capital account reversals but 
no recession according to our definition (Egypt and Pakistan). Four emerging economies 
experienced  recessions  but  no  capital  account  reversal  a  la  Guidotti,  Villar,  and 
Sturzenegger (2004) (Algeria, Colombia, India, and South Africa). As noticed by other 
authors (see Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia, 2004), there is clustering of these three types of 
events  around  the  Latin  American  Debt  Crisis,  the  Mexican  Tequila  Crisis,  and  the 
Asian ad Russian Crisis (see Figure 1). However, these are clearly not the only events in 
the  sample,  since  as  noticed  in  the  literature  (see  Guidotti,  Villar,  and  Sturzenegger 
(2004) and Rothemberg and Warnock (2006), among others) sudden stops are common. 
In fact, since 1980, there are only four years where no country in our sample of 47 was 
experiencing a sudden stop episode.   
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Industry-level  output  data  come  from  United  Nations  (2007),  Industrial  Statistics 
Database (UNIDO). This database reports various measures of industry-level activity, 
such  as  output,  value-added,  and  industrial  production,  for  28  three-digit  ISIC 
manufacturing industries comprising the  entire manufacturing sector across the world 
with variable coverage during the period 1960-2003. From this database we keep the 
data on all countries that JP Morgan classifies as emerging markets, and for which there 
is industrial data during the post Bretton-Woods period, 1975-2003. This leaves us with 
a sample of 45 countries. To measure the activity of each industry in each country we 
use the index of industrial production. Despite some coverage and consistency problems 
with this measure (see Yamada, 2005), it does not require deflating the nominal values 
reported, for instance, for value added. This is an important advantage when working 
with annual data, since it has been documented that price responses to sudden stops 
may be significantly different across sectors. Table 2 reports some summary statistics for 
the number of industries and growth rates of industries in the various countries included 
in the sample. In most countries, there is almost full coverage across the 28 industries 
and there is positive average industrial growth.  
We measure the degree of external dependence of an industry using balance sheet data of 
listed manufacturing industries in the US, following Rajan and Zingales (1998) approach 
of  considering  these  needs  to  be  at  least  partially  technologically  determined,  and 
measuring them in the United States, a country with well developed financial markets. 
The data used to build these measures comes from Compustat. To ease comparison and 
interpretation of the results reported below, the measure of external dependence, and all 
other industry level characteristics that are interacted with the sudden stop indicators 
(see next paragraph), are normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. 
Having a zero mean eases the interpretation of the   coefficient for the average effect of 
sudden stops in equation (1). Having a unit standard deviation eases the comparison  
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across interaction terms since one does not need to consider differences in the dispersion 
of industry characteristics to assess their differential economic significance. 
Sudden-stop recessions could have a differential impact on sectors for reasons unrelated 
to their external dependence that could be confounded with those related to working 
capital financing frictions. For instance, durable consumption is likely to decline more 
during  contractions;
6  thus,  if  an  industry’s  durability  is  correlated  with  its  external 
dependence, we could erroneously identify this cyclical durable demand as evidence of 
financial frictions related to working capital financing. Of course, it may also be the case 
that the cyclicality of durable industries results from their external dependence, but our 
data does not allow us to separate these hypotheses. At the very least, we are interested 
in determining if the results survive to controlling for the durability of goods. To control 
for this possibility we add to our specification the interaction of a dummy variable that 
identifies  industries  that  produce  durable  goods  with  the  indicator  of  sudden  stop 
recessions. Similarly, sudden stops may affect differently industries with different degrees 
of natural labor turnover because of their impact on employment levels and aggregate 
flows. As shown by Gallego and Tessada (2009), sudden stops increase aggregate labor 
destruction  and  depress  creation.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  that  these  episodes  affect 
relatively less those industries with higher labor turnover. We measure the natural labor 
turnover of an industry as the sum of its labor creation and destruction in the US, which 
we  obtain  from  Micco  and  Pages  (2006).  We  also  control  for  other  measures  of  the 
importance  of  financial  frictions  for  different  industries  such  as  their  degree  of  asset 
tangibility, which measures the pledgeability of a firm’s assets as collateral and proxies 
for  the  firm’s  borrowing  capacity  during  normal  times  (obtained  from  Braun,  2003). 
                                                            
6 For a detailed description of the volatility of aggregate durable and non-durable consumption 
see Attanasio (1999). The strong cyclicality of durable consumption has been long documented in 
the US. See, for instance Bils and Klenow (1998) and Yogo (2006).  
 
16 
Table  3  summarizes  the  values  of  the  various  industry  characteristics  previously 
described. To ease comparison with the literature, the table reports the original value of 
each  characteristic  but,  as  mentioned  above,  in  the  regressions  below  we  use  the 
normalized values of these variables (i.e. after subtracting the cross industry average and 
dividing by the standard deviation).  
 
4. Results 
The average impact of sudden stops in the production of manufacturing industries and 
their  differential  effect  across  industries  with  different  external  financing  needs  are 
documented in Table 4. The results indicate that, on average, sudden stops have a large 
negative and statistically significant impact on average manufacturing growth and that 
this  impact  is  larger  in  industries  with  high  external  dependence  (Column  (1)).  The 
differential effect across sectors is large. For the average industry, a typical sudden stop 
reduces industrial production in about 5 percent, but for an industry with a level of 
external financing needs of one (equal to one standard deviation above the mean), the 
decline is 3 percentage points larger than for an industry with a level of minus one (one 
standard deviation below the mean). This difference is almost as large as the average 
effect. This is consistent with sudden stops being associated to a tightening of financing 
constraints in the average country, and indicates that financial frictions may be behind 
the  transmission  of  sudden  stops  to  the  real  economy,  as  conjectured  by  many 
theoretical papers. 
Consistent with sudden stops operating through financing constraints, both the average 
and  differential  effect  of  sudden  stops  are  significantly  larger  in  countries  with  less 
developed financial system. Among market-access countries (mainly emerging markets),  
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the average decline in manufacturing output after a sudden stop is almost 7 percent, and 
the difference in decline among industries one standard deviation above and below the 
median of external dependence is 4 percent. Among industrial countries, the figures are 2 
and  1.8  percent,  respectively.  Similarly,  in  countries  with  low  financial  development 
(those with average total capitalization to GDP below the sample median), the average 
decline is 7.6 percent and the differential decline is 5 percent. Among countries with high 
financial development, the average decline is 2.6 percent, and the differential decline is 
1.2 (not significant). The bottom of the table shows the p-values for the tests that the 
average and differential effects are similar across groups of countries (i.e. Market Access 
vs. Industrial and Low Financial Development vs. High Financial Development). The 
tests  show  that  the  differences  mentioned  above  are  statistically  significant  at 
conventional levels. The only difference that does not reach significance is that between 
Market Access and Industrial countries in Panel A.  
Not  surprisingly,  the  average  and  differential  effect  of  sudden  stops  are  much  larger 
when they coincide with a recession (Panel B). In these cases, there is a 10 percent 
average manufacturing output decline, and a differential decline of 5.6 percent. Among 
market access or financially underdeveloped countries, the average decline reaches 13 
percent, and the differential decline 8 percent. As before, the figures are significantly 
smaller among industrial countries or financially developed ones. 
Overall, the main results cannot reject the hypothesis that sudden stops result in output 
contractions by tightening financial constraints. The evidence unambiguously shows that 
these episodes result in a larger output decline among industries with higher external 
financial needs, especially so in financially underdeveloped countries. The results also 
show that  most of this differential effect occurs when sudden stops coincide  with an 
aggregate output contraction (recession).      
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Using  a  simple  indicator  for  the  occurrence  of  a  sudden  stop  allows  us  to  compare 
average  growth  rates  during  these  episodes  with  other  times  and  across  groups  of 
countries.  However,  it  has  the  disadvantage  of  not  controlling  for  the  size  of  the 
aggregate  contraction  resulting  from  the  sudden  stop.  Thus,  the  larger  average  and 
differential  declines  observed  among  less  financially  developed  countries  might  result 
from sudden stops being associated with larger aggregate declines among these countries, 
without  larger  declines  in  externally  dependent  industries  per  point  of  output 
contraction.  The  results  in  Table  5  show  that  this  is  not  the  case.  The  regressions 
reported in this table replace the sudden stops indicators for their interaction with the 
corresponding GDP growth rate. Therefore, each coefficient captures the output impact 
of a sudden stop that coincides with a one percent increase in GDP. Of course, this 
means  that  the  sign  of  the  coefficients  reverse.  On  average,  a  sudden  stop  of  a  one 
percent GDP decline results in a 1 percent manufacturing output contraction. The same 
sudden stop results in a 0.6 percent differential decline between industries one standard 
deviation above and below the mean level of external financing needs. As in the baseline 
results, the magnitudes of the average and differential declines are significantly larger 
among market access and less financially developed countries.  
The results in Panel B show that, while the overall effects of sudden stops are larger 
when they are actually associated with a recession, their differential effect across groups 
of  countries  are  smaller.  Their  average  effect  per  percentage  point  of  output  decline 
among market access and industrial countries is very similar and even higher among 
more financially developed ones. The point estimates for the differential effect across 
sectors  with  different  external  financing  needs  is  still  larger  among  less  financially 
developed countries. Industries with high external financing needs located in financially 
underdeveloped countries contract more per unit of aggregate output contraction during 
a sudden stop than their peers in more financially developed countries. However, the  
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two-sided test of equality of coefficients cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients 
are the same at standard levels of confidence. 
The results in Panels A and B  together reveal that sudden stops have lower output 
impact among manufacturing industries in less financially developed countries because 
they  are  more  frequently  associated  with  aggregate  contractions  in  this  group  of 
countries. Conditional on being associated with an aggregate contraction, sudden stops 
not surprisingly result in similar declines per unit of aggregate output drop across groups 
of  countries,  but  still  have  a  larger  differential  effect  among  externally  dependent 
industries. This set of findings provides further additional support to the hypothesis that 
the  association  between  sudden  stops  and  aggregate  contractions  results  from  the 
tightening of financial constraints. 
As  discussed  above,  Chari,  Kehoe,  and  MacGrattan  (2005)  showed  that  in  a  simple 
model with an external financing constraint but without frictions, a sudden stop would 
result in an expansion in output because of its wealth effect. Countries would like to 
produce  more to  repay  their  debt  without  drastically  reducing consumption.  In  their 
simple model, the only good available is tradable, but of course, debt repayment requires 
the production of tradable goods (a trade surplus). In a less stylized version, the current 
account  reversals  associated  with  these  sudden  stops  would  probably  require  the 
reallocation  of  factors  towards  exportable  goods.  This  means  that  any  pressure  for 
production  expansion  would  fall  disproportionally  on  those  goods  where  the  country 
suffering  the  sudden  stop  has  comparative  advantages.  Thus,  one  would  expect  the 
tightening of financing constraints to be less important to sectors that are favored by the 
movements in relative prices. To check for evidence of this mechanism, we constructed 
an  average  index  of  revealed  comparative  advantages  (a  la  Balassa,  1965)  for  each 
industry in each country, and separated those industries within a country with an index  
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above  and  below  the  country  median  as  those  with  high  and  low  comparative 
advantages.  We  then  estimated  the  baseline  specification  separately  in  each  of  these 
groups.  The  results,  reported  in  Table  6,  strongly  support  the  view  that  financing 
constraints are less important for these sectors and that there are relative pressures to 
expand production in them. Across all countries, the average output decline in a sudden 
stop in industries with low comparative advantages is 6 percent (Column (1)), while in 
industries with high comparative advantages is about half as large at 4 percent (Column 
(2)). This is consistent with the reallocation toward tradable industries predicted by the 
wealth  mechanism  in,  Kehoe,  and  MacGrattan  (2005),  and  also  consistent  with  the 
segmented  market  mechanism  in  Martin  and  Rey  (2007).  Similarly,  the  differential 
output  decline  of  an  industry  with  low  comparative  advantages  and  high  external 
dependence, relative to one with low external dependence is 4 percent (Column (1)). 
Among  industries  with  high  revealed  comparative  advantages,  this  difference  is  0.2 
percent. The bottom of panel A shows the results of tests for the equality of coefficients 
between the coefficients reported in columns (1) and (2) for industries with low and high 
comparative advantage. The tests confirm that the differences in average and differential 
effects of a sudden stop between the two groups of industries are statistically significant. 
Similarly,  comparing  columns  (3)  and  (4)  with  (5)  and  (6)  shows  that  the  larger 
differential of sudden stops in industries  with high external dependence in financially 
underdeveloped countries is strong only among industries with low revealed comparative 
advantages.  The  difference  in  the  coefficient  for  the  interaction  of  sudden  stops  and 
external finance between columns (3) and (4) (financially underdeveloped countries) is 
larger  than  between  columns  (5)  and  (6)  (financially  developed  countries),  but  the 
former  is  not  significant at  conventional  levels.  Panel B  shows  that  considering  only 
sudden-stop recessions does not change the conclusions. Thus, the pressure to relocate 
factors  toward  more  tradable  industries  or  the  decline  in  domestic  demand  for  non- 
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tradables  hurt  specially  those  firms  in  non-tradable  industries  that  also  have  high 
external financial needs. The interaction of a weak pressure for relative expansion and 
limited of access to finance plays strongly against these industries. 
Overall, the evidence is consistent with sudden stops being associated with tightening of 
financial  constraints  resulting  from  the  need  of  firms  for  external  financing  of  their 
operations. Consistent with this mechanism, the evidence shows that the output decline 
of an industry during a sudden stop is larger for industries with high needs for external 
financing,  operating  in  financially  underdeveloped  countries,  and  without  revealed 
comparative advantages. These findings fare well with the literature that proposes that 
financial  constraints  at  the  microeconomic  level,  most  likely  those  associated  with 
working  capital  financing,  are  behind  the  propagation  of  sudden  stops  to  the  real 
economy. The next section further tests the robustness of these findings and show that 
they are not driven by specific measurement or modeling choices, or by straightforward 
omitted variables.      
5. Robustness 
Sudden stops may have differential effects across sectors for reasons unrelated to their 
need for external financing that our main coefficient may wrongly capture when other 
industrial characteristics are omitted. To check for this possibility, in Table 7 we add to 
the  baseline  specification  a  series  of  interactions  between  different  industrial 
characteristics and the sudden stop indicators. The regression in column (1) controls for 
potential heterogeneous effects of sudden stops in industries producing durable goods to 
control for the cyclicality of their demand. There is a positive correlation of 0.22 between 
external dependence and durability and, as discussed earlier, durable goods’ production 
is more cyclical than that of other goods (Bils and Klenow, 1998). The results confirm 
that, indeed, the production of durable goods contracts significantly more during sudden  
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stops. Their average decline is 4 percent larger than that of non-durable industries. The 
coefficient for the interaction between sudden stops and external financing declines in 
magnitude from -0.15 to -0.1, indicating that part of the difference documented came 
from  the  correlation  between  external  financing  needs  and  durability,  but  it  is  still 
economically  and  statistically  significant.  As  previously  discussed,  the  significant 
differential effect obtained for durable goods might just indicate that the production of 
(or demand for) these goods faces financing constraints in a manner not captured by the 
external dependence measure. If that were the case, part of this differential effect could 
still be associated with financing needs, and the main coefficient would be a conservative 
estimate of the true importance of financing needs. Our data, however, do not allow us 
to  disentangle  these  two  hypothesis  (we  do  not  have  a  good  continuous  measure  of 
durability) so we will keep focusing on the main coefficient. Nonetheless, because of the 
high significance of the durable goods interaction, we will maintain it in the rest of the 
robustness analysis.  
Capital-intensive sectors may be more dependent on the international capital flows that 
reverse during a sudden stop; however, we find no significant difference of the sudden 
stop indicator across those sectors (Column (2)). In addition, the tangibility of the assets 
of firms in various sectors probably relates to their debt capacity and to their ability to 
finance capital investment in financially underdeveloped environments or in tight credit 
conditions (see Almeida and Campello, 2007; Claessens and Laeven, 2003, and Braun, 
2003). The results, however, indicate that sectors with higher asset tangibility do not 
contract  relatively  more  during  sudden  stops  (Column  (3)).  In  both  regressions,  the 
coefficient for the interaction of sudden stops and external financing needs is unaffected.  
By increasing the aggregate level of unemployment and labor flows, sudden stops may 
affect  relatively  more  those  firms  in  sectors  that  naturally  experience  lower  labor  
 
23 
turnover,  since  workers  in  these  sectors  are  likely  to  have  higher  job-specific  human 
capital that would be costly wasted during the contraction. We check for this possibility 
adding  the  interaction  of  a  sector’s  job  turnover  in  the  US  with  the  sudden  stop 
indicator,  and  find  that,  while  the  main  result  remains  unaffected,  there  is  no 
heterogeneous effect of sudden stops along this dimension (Column (4)). To the extent 
that the measure of sectoral turnover adequately captures the sensitivity of industries to 
labor market frictions, as conjectured by Micco and Pages (2006), these results do not 
support the models that put labor market frictions at the center of the transmission of 
sudden stops to the real economy (Kehoe and Ruhl, 2007).  
Since controlling for durability has some impact on the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient of interest, we re-estimated all the baseline results controlling for durability. 
The  results  are  reported  in  Table  8.  As  expected,  the  main  coefficient  is  somewhat 
smaller,  but  it  is  still  economically  meaningful  and  statistically  significant  across 
specifications. Also, the result that the coefficient is larger (in magnitude) in emerging 
markets  and  financially  underdeveloped  countries  remains  unaltered.  Interestingly, 
however, the coefficient for the interaction with durability is also systematically larger in 
emerging markets and financially underdeveloped countries. The relative contraction of 
industries producing  durable-goods  in these countries is larger than in industrial and 
more financially developed countries (where most of the existing evidence on durable 
goods  cyclicality  comes  from).  This  suggests  that  part  of  the  contraction  in  durable 
goods output is due to the tightening of financing constraints, further confirming the 
view that sudden stops are indeed associated with these tightening, and provides support  
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to the recent literature that focuses on the interaction of credit market frictions and 
durable expenditures (Attanasio et al., 2008; Monacelli, 2009).
7 
There are many different indicators of the occurrence of sudden stop s available in the 
literature, each with its own advantages and problems. Our choice of a simple indicator 
is motivated by the desire to have comprehensive coverage, but we checked whether our 
results are crucially driven by this choice by also using  three  alternative indicators 
constructed  following the methods of  Rothemberg and Warnock (2006), and Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Mejia (2008), and Gallego and Tessada (2009), as described in section 3 
above. Table 9 reports the results. While there are some small quan titative differences 
with the results using the baseline measure of sudden stops, the main message one gets 
from the table is that the conclusions are largely unaffected. Regardless of the measure, 
Sudden Stops have a large negative average impact on indus try growth, especially for 
those industries with high external financing needs. The difference in decline between an 
industry with high and low external financing needs (one standard deviation above and 
below the mean) is between 3 and  4 percentage points  depending on the specification. 
When considering sudden stop regressions these differences increase to between 4 and 6 
percent. 
Finally, the regressions in Table 10 show that the findings discussed above are robust to 
changes in the specific measure of activity, and to changes in the estimation procedure. 
The regressions in columns (1) and (5) use the Braun and Larrain (2006)’s measure of 
recessions, reaching similar qualitative and quantitative conclusions. The regressions in 
columns (2) and (6) address the concern that developed countries may have an excessive 
weight on the results because they typically have better industry coverage. To control 
                                                            
7 Traditional business cycles models can create volatility in durable expenditure through simple 
stock-flow mechanisms (e.g. Baxter, 1996)   
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for this we re-estimate the baseline model weighting each observation by the inverse of 
the number of industries reported in a country in a given year. Lastly, the regressions in 
columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) change the set of fixed effects included in the regression. 
Columns  (3)  and  (7)  replace  the  year  fixed  effects  by  industry-year  fixed  effects  to 
capture global industry trends, and columns (4) and (8) replace the year fixed effects by 
country-year fixed effects to capture country level aggregate fluctuations. Across all the 
specifications, the coefficient for the interaction of the sudden stop indicator and external 
finance remains unaltered. 
6. Do Policies Matter? 
Because of the association of sudden stops with large contractions on the real side of the 
economy,  countries  take  many  measures  to  prevent  the  occurrence  and  mitigate  the 
consequences  of  these  episodes.  The  accumulation  of  large  amounts  of  reserves  has 
recently become a popular measure, both to prevent sudden stops driven by attacks on 
the currency and to have resources to provide liquidity in case a sudden stop occurs 
(self-insurance) (see Rodrik, 2006, and Aizenman and Lee, 2007). Along the same lines, 
the easing of monetary policy to stimulate internal demand is also typically considered 
once a sudden stop occurs (Stiglitz, 2002; Caballero and Krishnamurty, 2003; Braggion, 
Christiano,  and  Roldos,  2005;  Ortiz  et  al.,  2009).  In  what  follows,  we  evaluate  the 
shielding and dampening effects of these types of policy measures. 
To  evaluate  whether  the  amount  of  international  reserves  help  smooth  the  real 
consequences of a sudden stop, we add to the baseline specification the interaction of all 
the main variables with the ratio of international reserves to GDP before the beginning 
of  the  sudden  stop.  If  a  higher  level  of  reserves  helps  smooth  some  of  the  negative 
consequences of sudden stops (either the average or differential effect), the coefficients of 
these  triple  interactions  should  be  significantly  positive.  The  results  are  reported  in  
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Table 11. Looking at the occurrence of sudden stops only, the results in Panel A show 
that  a  higher  level  of  reserves  significantly  smoothes  its  negative  average  output 
consequences, and to a lesser extent, its differential consequences among sectors with 
high external dependence (although not significantly so). The dampening effect on the 
average output decline is somewhat larger among emerging markets than in industrial 
countries and clearly larger in financially underdeveloped countries than in financially 
developed ones. In addition, among emerging markets the differential effect of sudden 
stops across industries with different external financing needs is significantly larger than 
among industrial countries.  
Interestingly,  there  is  no  such  dampening  effect  when  considering  only  sudden-stop 
recessions. If anything, the average output decline in a sudden-stop recession is larger 
among countries with higher international reserves. This suggests that once the sudden 
stop actually results in a recession, having large volumes of reserves offers little help. 
The relatively larger decline among countries with higher initial reserves likely indicates 
that sudden stops that become recessions despite these larger reserves tend to be larger. 
What can then be done to dampen the impact of a sudden stop once it has already 
induced a recession? A policy measure that has been hotly debated, especially after the 
onset of the Asian Crisis of 1997, is the role of expansive monetary policy. The trade-off 
typically  mentioned  was  between  expanding  internal  demand  and  maintaining 
international  demand  for  a  country’s  assets.
8  While  the  former  may  require  reducing 
interest rates, the latter require maintaining high interest rates. The results in Table 12 
                                                            
8 See Fisher (1998) for the view that monetary policy should tighten during a sudden stop, and 
Stiglitz (2002) for an argument for easing monetary policy. On the theoretical front Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy  (2005)  argue  for  an  ex-ante  expansive  monetary  policy,  Bragion  et  al.  (2005) 
argue that a tightening followed by a loosening is optimal, and Hevia (2007) argues in favor of 
monetary tightening.  
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suggest that, on average, among these countries, a monetary loosening helped reduce the 
average and differential effects of sudden stops. While a sudden stop induces an average 
growth decline of almost 3 percent, there was little decline in countries that reduced 
their interest rate by 50 percent (respect to the pre sudden-stop level, see Column (1)). 
A similar decline in interest rates would also smooth the relative decline experienced by 
industries  with  high  external  financing  needs.  Comparing  across  groups  of  countries, 
these effects are larger among market access than among industrial countries, and among 
financially underdeveloped countries than in financially developed ones.
9 In contrast to 
Table 11, the regressions in panel B show a similar pattern : interest rate cuts help 
smooth the real growth consequences of sudden stops, especially in market access and 
financially underdeveloped countries. This indicates that this policy works precisely by 
attenuating  the impact of  the sudden  stops that resulted in an  aggregate  output 
contraction. These findings are consistent with those of Ortiz et al. (2009) , but apply to 
a broader set of episodes than the systemic sudden stops they use to reduce the concerns 
of endogeneity resulting from their reliance on aggregate data.       
7. Conclusion 
Sudden stops in capital inflows are typically associated with large contractions in real 
activity. While part of the literature takes this as guaranteed, from a theoretical point of 
view a sudden stop puts pressure to expand production through wealth effects and the 
                                                            
9 This also shows that the difference documented in the baseline results between market access 
and industrial countries does not only come from the contrast between emerging markets that 




correlation between sudden stops and recessions require the presence of real rigidities 
that overcome this pressure. 
This paper used industry-level data from emerging and industrial countries to provide 
evidence  of  the  likely  nature  of  these  rigidities  by  documenting  how  the  differential 
response of industries to sudden stops relates to industry characteristics that proxy for 
their vulnerability to some of their rigidities. In particular, we show that industries that 
require  higher  levels  of  external  financing  suffer  more  from  these  episodes,  especially 
when, at the aggregate level, the sudden stop coincides with recessions, and particularly 
so among less financially developed countries. This strongly suggests that a feature of 
these episodes is the tightening of financing constraints and that financing rigidities at 
the micro level are behind the negative consequences of sudden stops. 
The paper also explored the role of two common policy actions aimed at preventing and 
reducing the impact of sudden stops: reserve accumulation and monetary loosening. Our 
findings suggest that while reserve accumulation may help reducing the probability that 
a sudden stop will coincide with a recession, it does not change the pattern of responses 
once  they  coincide.  Nonetheless,  we  also  find  that  a  monetary  loosening  may  indeed 
smooth the average and differential impact of sudden stops across industries, both by 
reducing the correlation between sudden stops and recessions, and by dampening their 
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Australia 1982,1990 -- --
Austria -- -- --
Belgium 1993 -- --
Bulgaria 1989-1997 1989,1990,1994,1996 1989-1997
Canada 1982,1991 1982 1982
Chile 1982-1983,1999 1982,1983,1998 1982-1983
Colombia 1999 -- --










Dominican Republic 1985,1990,2003 2002 2003
Ecuador 1982-1983,1987,1999 1983,1999,2000 1999
Egypt -- 1990 --
Finland 1976,1991-1993 1986,1988,1991 1991-1993
France 1993 -- --
Hungary 1988,1990-1992 1990,1994,1996 1990-1992
India 1979 -- --
Indonesia 1998 1997,1998 1998
Ireland 1983,1986 1999,2001 --
Italy 1993 -- --
Japan 1998-1999 -- --
Jordan 1988-1989 1992,1993 --
Korea 1980,1998 1986,1997 1998
Malaysia 1985,1998 1987,1994,1997 1998
Mexico 1982-1983,1986,1995 1982,1994,1995 1982-1983
Table 1. Recessions, Capital Account Reversals, and Sudden Stops across Emerging and Developed 
Economies
Recessions Sudden Stops Sudden Stop Recessions
Continues next pageCountry
Recessions Sudden Stops Sudden Stop Recessions
Morocco 1981,1987,1992-1993 1978,1979,1983,1995 --





Nigeria 1978,1983-1984,1987 1992,1996,1999,2002 --
Norway -- -- --
Pakistan -- 1998 --
Peru 1982-1983,1988-1990 1983,1998 --





Portugal 1983-1984,1993,2003 1979,1983,1986,1992 1983-1984





Spain 1993 1992 1993
Sweden 1977,1991-1993 1991,1995 1991-1993
Switzerland 1976,1982,1991,2003 1979,1996,2004 --


















Algeria 25 0.069 Korea 28 0.076
Australia 28 0.014 Malaysia 26 0.074
Austria 28 0.023 Mexico 26 0.038
Belgium 28 0.002 Morocco 23 0.022
Bulgaria 7 0.002 Netherlands 25 0.008
Canada 28 0.019 New Zealand 28 0.008
Chile 28 0.017 Nigeria 8 0.001
Colombia 28 0.016 Norway 28 -0.005
Costa Rica 24 0.020 Pakistan 9 0.038
Cote d'Ivoire 16 0.015 Peru 28 -0.006
Denmark 28 0.021 Philippines 28 0.114
Dominican Republic 5 0.029 Poland 27 0.030
Ecuador 28 0.062 Portugal 27 0.024
Egypt 27 0.049 Russia 21 -0.018
Finland 28 0.022 South Africa 28 -0.004
France 26 0.002 Spain 28 0.010
Hungary 27 0.010 Sweden 28 0.003
India 28 0.044 Switzerland 13 0.007
Indonesia 25 0.067 Tunisia 25 0.051
Ireland 27 0.034 Turkey 28 0.049
Italy 28 0.007 United Kingdom 28 -0.001
Japan 27 0.005 Uruguay 28 0.003
Jordan 16 0.027








311 Food products 0.137 0 0.378 17.866 42218
313 Beverages 0.077 0 0.279 16.639 95034
314 Tobacco -0.451 0 0.221 13.650 102655
321 Textiles 0.277 0 0.373 18.026 27212
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.029 0 0.132 25.264 6133
323 Leather products -0.140 0 0.091 23.885 14486
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic -0.078 0 0.117 21.951 9400
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.284 1 0.380 23.230 31113
332 Furniture, except metal 0.236 1 0.263 21.886 13201
341 Paper and products 0.154 0 0.558 12.251 98152
342 Printing and publishing 0.204 0 0.301 16.834 25701
351 Industrial chemicals 0.236 0 0.412 11.759 189841
352 Other chemicals 0.793 0 0.197 18.382 62619
353 Petroleum refineries 0.042 0 0.671 8.137 464417
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.334 0 0.304 18.717 67995
355 Rubber products 0.226 0 0.379 15.286 43315
356 Plastic products 1.140 0 0.345 22.505 34568
361 Pottery, china, earthenware -0.146 1 0.075 17.833 22517
362 Glass and products 0.528 1 0.331 15.345 58958
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.062 1 0.420 22.259 54467
371 Iron and steel 0.087 1 0.458 15.167 90854
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.005 1 0.383 16.753 72482
381 Fabricated metal products 0.237 1 0.281 20.612 27397
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.724 1 0.183 19.744 37498
383 Machinery, electric 0.846 1 0.213 19.382 42359
384 Transport equipment 0.300 1 0.255 18.457 48995
385 Professional & scientific equipment 0.961 1 0.151 17.221 30482
390 Other manufactured products 0.470 1 0.188 23.978 19097



















-0.216*** -0.290*** -0.060 -0.286** -0.158* -0.227*** -0.306*** -0.065 -0.305** -0.164*
(0.078) (0.095) (0.107) (0.125) (0.095) (0.075) (0.092) (0.104) (0.122) (0.091)
-0.052*** -0.066*** -0.023*** -0.077*** -0.027*** -0.100*** -0.128*** -0.046*** -0.127*** -0.081***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007)
-0.015*** -0.020*** -0.009** -0.025*** -0.006 -0.028*** -0.040*** -0.009* -0.042*** -0.016**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007)
Observations 22010 11113 10897 9184 12627 22010 11113 10897 9184 12627
Adjusted R-squared 0.124 0.112 0.178 0.109 0.149 0.124 0.112 0.178 0.109 0.149
Test Equal Avg Effect 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Test Equal Diff. Effect 0.172 0.054 0.010 0.078
Sudden Stop X External 
Finance
Table 4. Differential Effect of Sudden Stops in Industries with High External Financing Needs
Panel A: Sudden Stop Episodes Panel B: Sudden Stop Recession Episodes
Share of Manuf. Output 
(lagged)
Sudden Stop
The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction of a country's
total annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A (columns (1) to (5)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these
regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B
(columns (6) to (10)) consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is
associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and Zingales(1998)) and
varies only across industries. Sudden Stop X External Finance is the interaction between the respective sudden stop indicator and the measure of external finance.
Regressions in columns (1) and (6) include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and
industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (2) and (7) include only Market Access countries, and those in columns (3) and (8) only Industrial countries.
Regressions in columns (4) and (9) include only sample countries with average (1975-2005) total capitalization (stock market capitalization plus private creit to GDP)
below the sample median, and those in columns (5) and (10) those countries with total capitalization above the sample median. All regressions include country-
industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote























-0.232*** -0.311*** -0.064 -0.297** -0.168* -0.229*** -0.311*** -0.064 -0.307** -0.162*
(0.073) (0.092) (0.099) (0.126) (0.087) (0.074) (0.093) (0.103) (0.122) (0.090)
1.097*** 1.200*** 0.319*** 1.458*** 0.743*** 2.018*** 1.967*** 1.752*** 1.787*** 2.717***
(0.098) (0.117) (0.095) (0.157) (0.118) (0.146) (0.157) (0.228) (0.173) (0.246)
0.302*** 0.387*** -0.054 0.494*** 0.114 0.508*** 0.524*** 0.323* 0.551*** 0.385
(0.094) (0.111) (0.101) (0.145) (0.114) (0.138) (0.148) (0.187) (0.161) (0.241)
Observations 21982 11085 10897 9156 12627 21986 11089 10897 8492 13295
Adjusted R-squared 0.120 0.106 0.171 0.105 0.140 0.141 0.126 0.179 0.123 0.167
Test Equal Avg Effect 0.000 0.000 0.437 0.002
Test Equal Diff. Effect 0.003 0.039 0.399 0.567
Sudden Stop X Growth 
X External Finance
Table 5. Differential Effect of Sudden Stops in Industries with High External Financing Needs Controlling for Size of Suuden Stop
Panel A: Sudden Stop Episodes Panel B: Sudden Stop Recession Episodes
Share of Manuf. Output 
(lagged)
Sudden Stop X Growth
The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction of a country's
total annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A (columns (1) to (5)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these
regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel
B (columns (6) to (10)) consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is
associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. Sudden Stop X Growth is the interaction between the sudden stop indicator considered in each panel
and the contermporaneous real GDP growth rate. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and Zingales)) and varies only
across industries. Sudden Stop X Growth X External Finance represents the triple interaction of the sudden stop indicator, the contemporaneous growth rate and
the external finance measure.Regressions in columns (1) and (6) include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international
financial markets (Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (2) and (7) include only Market Access countries, and those in
columns (3) and (8) only Industrial countries. Regressions in columns (4) and (9) include only sample countries with average (1975-2005) total capitalization (stock
market capitalization plus private creit to GDP) below the sample median, and those in columns (5) and (10) those countries with total capitalization above the
sample median. All regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are













Panel A: Sudden Stop Episodes
-0.565*** -0.124 -0.976** -0.078 -0.290** -0.091
(0.179) (0.083) (0.376) (0.115) (0.142) (0.110)
-0.063*** -0.039*** -0.087*** -0.062*** -0.036*** -0.017***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
-0.023*** -0.001 -0.032** -0.010 -0.012** 0.003
(0.007) (0.005) (0.014) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 10645 10880 4546 4638 6044 6148
Adjusted R-squared 0.117 0.104 0.098 0.102 0.141 0.120
Test Equal Avg Effect 0.005 0.096 0.039
Test Equal Diff. Effect 0.011 0.186 0.055
Panel B: Sudden Stop Recession Episodes
-0.575*** -0.132* -0.996*** -0.094 -0.296** -0.093
(0.177) (0.080) (0.380) (0.109) (0.133) (0.107)
-0.104*** -0.090*** -0.125*** -0.117*** -0.091*** -0.068***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009)
-0.046*** 0.001 -0.079*** -0.000 -0.023*** 0.003
(0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011)
Observations 10645 10880 4546 4638 6044 6148
Adjusted R-squared 0.128 0.118 0.110 0.118 0.160 0.131
Test Equal Avg Effect 0.303 0.728 0.106
Test Equal Diff. Effect 0.000 0.001 0.056
Table 6. Differential Effect of Sudden Stops Depending on an Industry's Degree of Reveraled Comparative Advantage
Sudden Stop Rec. X External 
Finance
All Countries Low Financial Dev. High Financial Dev.
Share of Manuf. Output (lagged)
Sudden Stop
Sudden Stop X External Finance
Share of Manuf. Output (lagged)
Sudden Stop Recession
The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction
of a country's total annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A consider the impact of sudden stop episodes.
In these regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero
otherwise. Regressions in Panel B consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for
external financing (Rajan and Zingales)) and varies only across industries. Sudden Stop X External Finance and Sudden Stop Rec. X External
Finance are the interaction between the respective sudden stop indicators and the measure of external finance. In each panel, regressions in columns
(1) and (2) include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and
industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (3) and (4) include only sample countries with average (1975-2005) total capitalization
(stock market capitalization plus private creit to GDP) below the sample median, and those in columns (5) and (6) those countries with total
capitalization above the sample median. Column (1) shows the results for industries with low average revealed comparative advantage (below the
within country median) and (2) those for industries with high average revealed comparative advantage (above the within country median). The same
applies to the other pair of columns. All regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered








-0.217*** -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.229*** -0.232*** -0.231*** -0.230***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
-0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
-0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
-0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037***







Observations 22010 22010 22010 22010 22010 22010 22010 22010
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127
Table 7. Robustness to Controlling for other Industry Characteristics
Sudden Stop X Capital 
per Wkr.
Sudden Stop X Labor 
Mo. Flex.
Panel A: Sudden Stop Episodes Panel B: Sudden Stop Recesion Episodes
Share of Manuf. 
Output (lagged)
Sudden Stop Recession
Sudden Stop Rec. X 
External Finance
Sudden Stop X 
Durable
Sudden Stop X 
Tangibility
The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output
is the fraction of a country's total annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A (columns (1) to
(5)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a
country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B (columns (6) to (10)) consider the impact
of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with
an output contraction and zero otherwise. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and
Zingales)) and Durable is an indicator that takes a value of one for industries producing durable goods and zero otherwise.
Tangibility, Natural turnover, and Capital per Wkr. are measures of an industry's asset tangibility (Braun and Larrain (2006)), natural
labor turnover (Micco and Pages (200X), and capital per worker. Bogus is a random variable with zero mean and unit standard
deviation. These measures are industry specific and all have been normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Sudden
Stop X External Finance is the interaction between the respective sudden stop indicator and the measure of external finance. The same
applies to the other interaction variables. All regressions include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to
international financial markets (Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). All regressions include country-industry and year























-0.217*** -0.291*** -0.062 -0.294** -0.157* -0.229*** -0.302*** -0.071 -0.303** -0.166*
(0.077) (0.095) (0.106) (0.124) (0.094) (0.075) (0.092) (0.104) (0.123) (0.091)
-0.052*** -0.066*** -0.023*** -0.077*** -0.027*** -0.100*** -0.129*** -0.046*** -0.128*** -0.081***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
-0.010** -0.013* -0.007** -0.018** -0.004 -0.018*** -0.027*** -0.005 -0.029** -0.009
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007)
-0.021*** -0.031*** -0.007* -0.032*** -0.011** -0.039*** -0.052*** -0.019*** -0.051*** -0.028***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007)
Observations 22010 11113 10897 9184 12627 22010 11113 10897 9184 12627
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.099 0.174 0.101 0.135 0.127 0.116 0.180 0.113 0.151
Test Equal Avg Effect 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test Equal Diff. Effect 0.431 0.118 0.059 0.150
Test Equal Diff. Eff. (Durable) 0.002 0.026 0.005 0.098
Sudden Stop X External 
Finance
Sudden Stop X Durable
Table 8. Controlling for Durability of the Goods
Panel A: Sudden Stop Episodes Panel B: Sudden Stop Recession Episodes
Share of Manuf. Output 
(lagged)
Sudden Stop
The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction of a country's total
annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Panel A considers the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Panel B considers the impact of sudden stop recession episodes captured by a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for
external financing (Rajan and Zingales)) and Durable indicates whether an industry produces durable goods. Both vary only across industries. Sudden Stop X External Finance
(Durable) is the interaction between the respective sudden stop indicator and the measure of external finance (durable). Regressions in columns (1) and (6) include all
countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in
columns (2) and (7) include only Market Access countries, and those in columns (3) and (8) only Industrial countries. Regressions in columns (4) and (9) include only sample
countries with average (1975-2005) total capitalization below the sample median, and those in (5) and (10) countries with total capitalization above the sample median. All
regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **,
and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reversals 
greater than 1 
sd and reach 2 
sd
Reversals 
greater than 1 





greater than 1 
sd and reach 2 
sd
Reversals 
greater than 1 




-0.222*** -0.173** -0.408** -0.223*** -0.181** -0.397**
(0.076) (0.081) (0.203) (0.076) (0.079) (0.200)
-0.075*** -0.049*** -0.056*** -0.083*** -0.110*** -0.113***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
-0.024*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.030*** -0.034***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
0.001 0.020** 0.028** 0.002 0.014 0.066***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.019)
Country-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22976 21032 5320 22976 21058 5376
Adjusted R-squared 0.109 0.100 0.171 0.110 0.107 0.215
Constant
Table 9. Robustness to Alternative Measures of Sudden Stops
Panel A: Sudden Stop Episodes Panel B: Sudden Stop Recession Episodes
Share of Manuf. Output 
(lagged)
Sudden Stop Recession
Sudden Stop Rec. X 
External Finance
The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of
output is the fraction of a country's total annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A
(columns (1) to (3)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B (columns (4) to (6))
consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden
stop is associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external
financing (Rajan and Zingales)). Sudden Stop X External Finance is the interaction between the respective sudden stop indicator
and the measure of external finance. All regressions include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to
international financial markets (Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (1) and (4) consider as
a sudden stop episode one that begins with capital account reversal larger than one standard deviation and eventually reaches 2
standard deviations. Standard deviations are computed using all available data from 1975 to 2005. Columns (2) and (5) define a
sudden stop as an episode with a capital account reversal larger than one standard deviation and that reaches 5 percent of GDP, as
in the baseline results. However, this measure is computed using quarterly data and a time varying standard deviation
corresponding to the cummulative standard deviation since 1975 until each date. Columns (3) and (6) use the systemic sudden stop
data from Calvo et al. (2005), which includes reversals larger than one standard deviation that result in output contractions and
that are associated with an increase in the EMBI. All regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity
robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5



























-0.216*** -0.100 -0.255*** -0.240*** -0.220*** -0.119 -0.264*** -0.247***
(0.078) (0.100) (0.083) (0.062) (0.076) (0.098) (0.080) (0.062)
-0.052*** -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.105*** -0.100***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
-0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.027***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Country-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 22010 22010 22010 21971 22120 22010 22010 21971
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.116 0.089 0.261 0.111 0.166 0.101 0.262
Table 10. Robustness to Alternative Measures of Activity and Econometric Procedure
Panel B: Sudden Stop Recession Episodes
Share of Manuf. Output 
(lagged)
Sudden Stop
Sudden Stop X External 
Finance
Panel A: Sudden Stop Episodes
The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction of a country's total
annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A (columns (1) to (4)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these regressions,
Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B (columns (5) to (8))
consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with an output
contraction and zero otherwise. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and Zingales (1998)) and has been normalized to have zero
mean and unit standard deviation. Sudden Stop X External Finance is the interaction between the respective sudden stop indicator and the measure of external finance. The
same applies to the other interaction variables. All regressions include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets
(Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (1) and (5) use the methodology of Braun and Larrain (2006) to define a recession. Regressions in
columns (2) and (6) give equal weight to all countries regardless of the number of manufdacturing industries for which there is data. This is done by using weights that are
inversely proportional to the number of industries reported by a country in each year. Regressions in columns (3) and (7) include industry-year FE to absorb global industry
trends, and those in columns (4) and (8) include country-year FE to absorb all aggregate determinants of fluctuations. All regressions include country-industry fixed effects.





















-0.218*** -0.298*** -0.059 -0.288** -0.159* -0.224*** -0.301*** -0.065 -0.292** -0.164*
(0.078) (0.093) (0.109) (0.127) (0.095) (0.074) (0.091) (0.104) (0.120) (0.091)
-0.071*** -0.091*** -0.045*** -0.093*** -0.043*** -0.073*** -0.080*** -0.051*** -0.000 -0.074***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.008) (0.030) (0.009)
0.241*** 0.300*** 0.219*** 0.304*** 0.133*** -0.205** -0.400* 0.059 -1.979*** -0.078
(0.038) (0.046) (0.064) (0.107) (0.031) (0.103) (0.217) (0.065) (0.533) (0.083)
-0.021*** -0.030*** -0.002 -0.030** -0.010* -0.016 -0.017 -0.010 0.019 -0.011
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.007) (0.026) (0.010)
0.056 0.096* -0.066 0.040 0.032 -0.122 -0.283 0.002 -1.104** -0.053
(0.040) (0.050) (0.058) (0.118) (0.029) (0.113) (0.262) (0.048) (0.485) (0.095)
Observations 21882 10985 10897 9056 12627 21910 11013 10897 9084 12627
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.094 0.175 0.092 0.135 0.117 0.101 0.178 0.100 0.149
Test Equal Avg Eff (Reserve) 0.304 0.125 0.043 0.000
Test Equal Diff. Effect 0.032 0.216 0.730 0.282
Test Equal Diff. Eff. (Reserve) 0.034 0.948 0.285 0.033
Sudden Stop X Ini. Res. X 
Ext. Finance
Table 11. Does the Initial Level of Reserves Help to Attenuate the Shocks?
Panel A: Sudden Stop Episodes Panel B: Sudden Stop Recession Episodes
Share of Manuf. Output 
(lagged)
Sudden Stop
Sudden Stop X Initial Reserves
Sudden Stop X External 
Finance
The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction of a country's total annual manufacturing
output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A (columns (1) to (5)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B (columns (6) to (10)) consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden
Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. Initial Reserves are the international reserves as a share of
GDP the year before the beginning of a sudden stop (sudden stop recession) episode. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and Zingales)) and varies
only across industries. Sudden Stop X Initial Reserves, Sudden Stop X External Finance, and Sudden Stop X Ini. Res. X Ext. Finance, denote the interactions between the variables described
above. Regressions in columns (1) and (6) include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and industrial
countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (2) and (7) include only Market Access countries, and those in columns (3) and (8) only Industrial countries. Regressions in columns (4) and (9)
include only sample countries with average (1975-2005) total capitalization (stock market capitalization plus private creit to GDP) below the sample median, and those in columns (5) and (10)
those countries with total capitalization above the sample median. All regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the

















-0.178** -0.239** -0.061 -0.225* -0.130 -0.206*** -0.277*** -0.065 -0.257** -0.156*
(0.077) (0.095) (0.107) (0.131) (0.092) (0.074) (0.090) (0.105) (0.117) (0.092)
-0.027*** -0.020*** -0.024*** 0.003 -0.021*** -0.073*** -0.067** -0.053*** -0.009 -0.079***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.029) (0.007) (0.034) (0.008)
-0.061*** -0.063*** -0.011 -0.097*** -0.011 -0.070*** -0.095*** -0.029** -0.154*** -0.059***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.035) (0.015) (0.037) (0.018)
-0.009*** -0.007 -0.009*** -0.025** -0.004 -0.014** 0.005 -0.017*** 0.013 -0.017**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.007) (0.028) (0.005) (0.029) (0.007)
-0.018* -0.019* -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 -0.035*** -0.058 -0.033*** -0.065* -0.033**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.035) (0.011) (0.036) (0.015)
Observations 21415 10518 10897 8706 12510 21659 10762 10897 8917 12543
Adjusted R-squared 0.115 0.087 0.174 0.086 0.144 0.115 0.089 0.179 0.086 0.153
Test Equal Avg Eff (Int. Rate) 0.014 0.000 0.083 0.021
Test Equal Diff. Effect 0.766 0.066 0.439 0.315
Test Equal Diff. Eff. (Int Rate) 0.682 0.924 0.496 0.412
Sudden Stop X Chg. Int. Rate 
X Ext. Finance
Panel A: Sudden Stop Episodes
Table 12. Does Monetary Easing Help to Attenuate the Shocks?
Panel B: Sudden Stop Recession Episodes
Share of Manuf. Output 
(lagged)
Sudden Stop
Sudden Stop X Change 
Interest Rate
Sudden Stop X External 
Finance
The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction of a country's total annual manufacturing
output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A (columns (1) to (5)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes
a value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B (columns (6) to (10)) consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes.
Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. Change Interest Rate is the cumulative
percentage decline in money market rates during the sudden stop episode. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and Zingales)) and varies only
across industries. Sudden Stop X Change Interest Rate, Sudden Stop X External Finance, and Sudden Stop X Chg. Int. Rate X Ext. Finance, denote the interactions between the variables
described above. Regressions in columns (1) and (6) include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and
industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (2) and (7) include only Market Access countries, and those in columns (3) and (8) only Industrial countries. Regressions in columns
(4) and (9) include only sample countries with average (1975-2005) total capitalization (stock market capitalization plus private creit to GDP) below the sample median, and those in columns
(5) and (10) those countries with total capitalization above the sample median. All regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered
at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.A. Number of Sudden Stops in the sample B. Number of Sudden Stop Recessions in the Sample
Figure 1. Number of Sudden Stops, Sudden Stop Recessions, and Recessions in the Sample, per year. 1975-2003
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year